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Cable sobre la acogida de presos por Eslovenia

En 2010 la embajada de Ljubljana informa de que el primer ministro de Eslovenia está dispuesto a acoger de presos con un encuentro con Obama "de al menos 20 minutos"

ID: 242451
Date: 2010-01-05 10:09:00
Origin: 10LJUBLJANA6
Source: Embassy Ljubljana
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno: 10LJUBLJANA385
Destination: VZCZCXRO0818
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHLJ #0006/01 0051009
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051009Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7616
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000006

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CE, EUR/SCE, AND S/GC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2020
TAGS: PREL, NATO, EUN, HR, BEXP, SI
SUBJECT: PM PAHOR PREVIEWS 2010: BALKANS, BUSINESS, ISAF
AND DETAINEES

REF: LJUBLJANA 385

Classified By: CDA Bradley Freden, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

SUMMARY

1. (C) In a December 30 meeting requested by PM Pahor, CDA
and Pahor discussed political and economic priorities for
2010, including the relocation of Guantanamo detainees,
stability and integration of the Western Balkans into the EU
and NATO, and Westinghouse involvement in the planned second
nuclear plant at Krsko. Pahor stated his support for
Westinghouse's participation in the replacement of the
country's sole nuclear plant, emphasized new taskforces in
the MFA and PM's office dedicated to the Western Balkans, and
spoke confidently of easy access to Balkan political leaders.
In response to CDA's request for assistance in closing
Guantanamo, Pahor said that he would ask the government (GoS)
to take detainees as long as "political" and "financial"
obligations were considered separately. In a one-on-one
pull-aside with CDA, Pahor linked acceptance of detainees to
"a 20-minute meeting" with POTUS. Pahor also expressed his
utmost appreciation for the efforts of the Embassy and the
USG in resolving the border dispute between Slovenia and
Croatia, and personally thanked CDA for his role. End Summary.


LOOKING TO EXPAND MARKETS AND INCREASE FDI

2. (C) PM Pahor discussed economic issues at length, noting
that he expected Slovenia's economic growth to reach 1% in
2010 from current negative levels and describing Slovenia's
expansion into new foreign markets. He confirmed that
Slovenia is expanding into the "Muslim" world - with recent
official visits to Libya and Egypt - and looking east to
India and China. Interestingly, Pahor stated that Slovenia
did not currently have the capacity to meet all the interest
shown by potential new foreign business partners. Pahor told
CDA that he was "ready to go ahead with the US" in the
upgrade and replacement of the country's sole nuclear plant
at Krsko, in which Westinghouse has a vested interest, even
though there was a strong competing offer from the French.
Implying the need for balance, Pahor pointed out that the
French already have a large investment in the production of
Renault automobiles and that Deutsche Bank was on the verge
of a large investment in Slovenia's railways, which would
include part of Slovenia's most important "strategic asset",
the port of Koper.


ENGAGEMENT IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

3. (C) Pahor and CDA discussed shared priorities and goals in
the Western Balkans, in particular the Butmir process and the
resolution of the Greece-Macedonia name issue. Pahor
described his active engagement with the Prime Ministers of
Macedonia and Greece to resolve the name issue and allow
Macedonia a clearer path toward EU and NATO membership.
Pahor said he felt the momentum had been lost due to the
financial crisis in Greece, and that his recent conversations
with Papandreou indicated that economic issues had pushed
everything else off the table. He is still planning a
bilateral visit to Macedonia early in 2010, but did not
specify the exact timing.

4. (C) Pahor emphasized his and Slovenia's ready access to
Balkan leadership and the recent establishment of taskforces
focused on Western Balkan issues within both his office and
the MFA. He expects the new MFA task force to have ready its
plan for Western Balkan engagement "within 40 days". Pahor
also commented on what he felt would be a difficult year for
the EU in 2010. He cited the implementation of the Lisbon
Strategy and development of institutions, the lack of a
common economic policy, and national economic plans pitting
countries against each other. He said he had already begun
taking advantage of his close relationship with Spanish PM
Zapatero to ensure that the Spanish EU Presidency did not
forget about the Western Balkans. Almost as an aside, he
expressed confidence that the border arbitration agreement
with Croatia would be ratified by parliament. CDA pointed
out that the final resolution of this issue, which had taken
so much of our attention in 2009, would allow us to move
ahead on other issues in 2010. He also congratulated Pahor on
the government's recent decision to deploy an OMLT in Herat

LJUBLJANA 00000006 002 OF 002


to train the Afghan National Army.

LOOKING FOR AN OFFER ON GUANTANAMO

5. (C) In response to CDA's specific request for support to
close Guantanamo, Pahor asked what the "offer" was, and what
the GoS needed to provide. He emphasized that any support or
obligations on the part of Slovenia must be separated into
financial and political spheres, meaning, essentially, that
he needed to be able to tell the cabinet that resettlement
would not impose any additional burden on the budget, which
is already deeply in deficit. Pahor said he would make the
case that Slovenia must stand with the US "in both good and
bad times" and he would do the best he could to convince the
GoS to accept detainees. However, it was apparent that Pahor
was as yet unaware of the obstacles and concerns presented by
the Ministry of Interior. CDA pointed out that our
conversations with the MoI led us to believe that legislation
might be required in order for Slovenia to accept detainees.
Pahor reiterated that he would be willing to make the case,
but in a one-on-one pull-aside with CDA, the PM gently - but
unambiguously - linked success on detainee resettlement to a
meeting with President Obama. He said that "a 20-minute
meeting" with POTUS would allow him to frame the detainee
question as an act of support for Slovenia's most important
ally and evidence of a newly-reinvigorated bilateral
relationship.


COMMENT: LOOKING AHEAD

6. (C) Pahor took the unusual step of calling on CDA at the
U.S. Embassy, the second time he has done so since taking
office a year ago, indicating to us that the U.S.-Slovenian
relationship is one he seeks to cultivate. He previewed 2010
during the meeting, describing in general terms Slovenia's
priorities - the economy and the Western Balkans - and
highlighting areas of likely US interest - expansion of the
Krsko nuclear facilities. While he seemed to have no single
objective in mind for the visit, most telling may have been
his constant reference to economic issues. While Pahor
stated that 2010 would be a better year economically for
Slovenia, he also made references to the remaining white
elephants in GoS inventory, the need for resolution of the
Patria weapons deal fiasco, and, most notably, the point that
financial and political obligations would have to be
considered separately were he to make the case for Slovenia
to accept detainees from Guantanamo.

7. (C) It is clear from this meeting and our earlier one with
FM Zbogar that Slovenia is counting on the resolution of the
border issue with Croatia to open the door to greater
bilateral cooperation, especially in the Western Balkans and
on trade and investment. In terms of U.S. interests in the
Western Balkans, Slovenia brings three comparative advantages
to the table: due to their common history, Slovenians have
an instinctive "feel" for the nuances of Western Balkan
politics and politicians; Slovenia is very active in the
region, not only on a diplomatic level, but commercially and
at the level of NGOs and educational exchange; and Slovenia's
views on the need to keep the EU focused on enlargement are
arguably the closest to our own of any EU member state. In
short, 2009 was the year that we focused most of our
diplomatic capital on resolving the border issue and
convincing Slovenia to lift its blockade of Croatia's
accession talks. The final chapter of that story is yet to
be written, but we sense unprecedented optimism among GoS
officials that it soon will be. 2010 will, we hope, be the
year that we focus our attention on partnering with Slovenia
in the Western Balkans and ISAF; paving the way for
Westinghouse to compete successfully for the construction of
a new nuclear power plant; and, perhaps most challenging of
all, turning Pahor's rhetorical support for detainee
resettlement into reality. END COMMENT.
SHULTZ