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Cable sobre la situación del contrato F-x2.

La embajada informa de la nueva propuesta de Boeing para llevar a Brasil la producción de ciertos elementos del F-18

ID:242528
Date:2010-01-05 19:40:00
Origin:10BRASILIA3
Source:Embassy Brasilia
Classification:CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:10BRASILIA1124
Destination:VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBR #0003/01 0051940
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051940Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0263
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0001
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0001
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000003

SIPDIS
STATE FOR T, PM AND WHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/05
TAGS: PREL, ETTC, MASS, BR
SUBJECT: FX2 at the End of 2009

REF: BRASILIA 1124; IIR 6 809 0156 10

CLASSIFIED BY: Lisa Kubiske, Charge d'Affaires a.i.; REASON: 1.4(D)

1. (C) As 2009 comes to end, Brazil's FX2 competition remains
undecided. It had been expected that President Lula would make a
decision before the end of the year, so as to be able to complete
the sale during his tenure. Practically speaking, however, even if
a Presidential decision were to be made immediately, the time
needed for contract negotiation and appropriation of funds means
that the final decision to buy the planes will fall to the next
President in 2011. Embassy contacts in the Ministry of External
Relations and Ministry of Defense believe that Defense Minister
Jobim will meet with Lula later in January to try to make a
decision.



SEPTEMBER: RAFALE PREFERRED



2. (C) Lula has made no secret of his preference for the Dassault
Rafale, announcing during President Sarkozy's September 7 visit
(ref a) that he planned to negotiate the purchase with France,
before even reading the Brazilian Air Force's (BRAF) technical
evaluation. During the following three months, it was clear that
Lula had instructed his government, including Jobim, to focus on
making the deal with France work. In September, Lula told the
Brazilian press that negotiations with France would focus on
attaining a price for the aircraft similar to what Boeing and Saab
were asking. (Reportedly, Dassault's best offer was 40% higher.)
Despite another Sarkozy visit to Brazil in November and Jobim's
later stop in Paris, the French were not able to meet Brazilian
requests for a lower price, but their lack of responsiveness (ref
b) did not seem to affect the Brazilian preference. Initial
statements in September from Lula and FM Amorim attempted to
portray the French as somehow offering a superior level of
technology transfer as justification for the higher price, but as
details emerged from the technical evaluation process, it became
clear that all three competitors were generally meeting BRAF tech
transfer requirements.



DECEMBER: NEW MOD INTEREST IN BOEING, SAAB STILL A CONTENDER



3. (C) During October and November, contacts by Embassy officials
and Boeing representatives were received politely, but with little
real interest as the focus remained on the French. In recent
weeks, however, there has been a notable change from the Minister
of Defense. Beginning with A/S Valenzuela's December 14 meeting
with Jobim (reported septel), there has been renewed interest in
the USG/Boeing proposal. While Jobim repeated concerns about "bad
precedents" for policies regarding transfer of U.S.-origin
technology (in reality complaints about export licensing
procedures), he said he understood that the USG had a new approach
and was interested in Boeing's industrial cooperation offer.
Boeing has strengthened its case by promoting its new "Global Super
Hornet" initiative, which would transfer important elements of
production of all F/A 18 aircraft (including those for the U.S.
military) to Brazil. By globalizing Super Hornet production and
including Brazil in the process, Boeing not only is in position to
create and maintain more jobs in Brazil, but can assuage Brazilian
paranoia about theoretical USG cutoffs of fighter supply by
pointing out that any such cutoff would affect the U.S. Navy as
well. In a recent interview with the newspaper Folha de Sao Paulo,
Jobim was careful not to commit, mentioning the "strategic
alliance" with France but also noting that cost, technology
transfer and overall aircraft capability were important.



4. (C) Along with the revival of Boeing's hopes, the Swedish
Gripen remains a strong competitor. As noted in ref b, many
Brazilians perceive it to be an attractive alternative to the
Rafale because it has the lowest sticker price. Saab's plan to
co-develop the new generation Gripen with Brazil has also garnered
support in Brazil's aviation industry among those who believe that
such development will increase local aircraft design capabilities.

Jobim, however, has been openly dismissive of the Swedes on the
basis of the Gripen's lesser capability and because the "New
Generation" variant offered to Brazil does not yet exist. A recent
story in Isto C) magazine with sourcing to the BRAF pointed out that
military aircraft development programs normally run over deadlines
and budgets, negating the Gripen's purported price advantage.



5. (C) COMMENT. While the Rafale's high price and doubts about
the Gripen's development would seem to make the Super Hornet the
obvious choice, the fact remains that Lula is reluctant to buy an
American aircraft. It is possible that the renewed interest in the
USG offer is merely a ploy to gain leverage on the French or that
the delay in the decision is intended to allow Dassault to find a
way to lower its price. In Mission's view, the chance to win the
FX2 competition is real. We know that the Super Hornet received
the most favorable technical evaluation from the BRAF and is the
choice of the operators. We have also been successful in answering
most of the doubts raised about USG technology transfer policies,
particularly with the technical evaluation team. There remains,
however, the formidable obstacle of convincing Lula. Our goal now
should be to make sure that Jobim has as strong a case as possible
to take to Lula in January. Mission recommends the following
steps:



B7 Continue to underline full USG support in all high-level
contacts with Brazil. As Mission has pointed out previously,
repeated assurances from President Obama to Lula in the course of
their normal contacts are the single most effective means of making
our case.



B7 Use Ambassador-Designate Shannon's initial contacts with
the Brazilian leadership to make the point that we have worked hard
to ensure we have the best offer.



B7 Maintain our public affairs campaign to highlight that
not only has the USG completed its approval of tech transfer, but
Boeing is confident enough in the offer to be prepared to shift
part of production (including hundreds of jobs) to Brazil.



B7 Coordinate with Boeing to ensure the advantages of the
Global Super Hornet program are made known to the Brazilian
Congress and media.
KUBISKE
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