Los intereses de EE UU en Guinea
Cable de EE UU que culpa a la prensa española de la mala percepción internacional que se tiene de Guinea Ecuatorial
La Embajada pone especial énfasis en la importancia de adoptar un papel diplomático activo para aprovechar oportunidades presentes y futuras en aquel país
| ID: | 199567 |
| Date: | 2009-03-30 12:41:00 |
| Origin: | 09MALABO31 |
| Source: | Embassy Malabo |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Dunno: | 09MALABO18 09MALABO27 |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO3778 OO RUEHMA DE RUEHMA #0031/01 0891241 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 301241Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY MALABO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0482 INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA IMMEDIATE 0041 RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE IMMEDIATE 0278 RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0016 RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE IMMEDIATE 0027 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0108 RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 0074 RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUEHMA/AMEMBASSY MALABO 0546 |
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MALABO 000031 SENSITIVE SIPDIS KHARTOUM FOR FERNANDEZ; HARARE FOR CHISHOLM; YAOUNDE FOR DATT E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL, ECON, PGOV, EPET, KCOR, PINR, SOCI, EK SUBJECT: EQUATORIAL GUINEA RAW 5: HOW IT WORKS -- WHY IT SOMETIMES DOESN'T REF: A)MALABO 27 B)MALABO 18 1. (U) Triggered by changes underway in Washington D.C., upcoming personnel rotations in Embassy Malabo and animated by the recent attack on the capital, this is the fifth in a series of cables intended to update our perspective on Equatorial Guinea, and to provide a ground-level view of one of the world's most-isolated and least-understood countries to interested readers. 2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Equatorial Guinea (EG) is a place that is trying to do everything at once, and doing some of it poorly. The parts it does best it hires out to others, whether construction of roads and bridges, new ministry buildings, or professionalization of security forces. When left to its own devices, it rarely succeeds, despite reasonably good intentions and mellowing, benign leadership, and because of huge capacity gaps. EG is a country emerging from a dark past of extreme isolation and poverty, now flush with cash and oil reserves but little else. Nonetheless, it is moving quickly, forging ahead without always completing the work of institutional development and legal reform (and shedding some resources to corruption and mismanagement), but also outstripping its retrospective critics. However, in leaving its Franco ghost behind, EG is unlikely to stumble upon the right path on its own. Steering the country in the right direction will require hands-on engagement. End SUMMARY. 3. (SBU) Punished by History: Equato-Guineans are, by nature and of experience, suspicious people. The long-isolated population developed the conservative affect of most such nations. Their early interactions with the outside, when they came, were almost always painful. Whether suffering as the prey of slavers, under the whip of colonialist coffee and cocoa farmers, or more recently from the privations of foreign "Tropical Gangsters" opportunistically looking to cheat, steal or otherwise benefit from the once-impoverished country, visitors were believed to bring problems. While the arrival of oil riches has only increased the flow of predators, it has also generated local sharks -- not to mention enhancing the country's profile as an attractive "takeover target." The challenges confronting a country that has moved from being one of the world's poorest to one of its richest (in per capita income terms) in less than a single generation are myriad. 4. (SBU) Of course, after starting with virtually nothing at independence and then going backwards for at least a decade, institutions that might help meet these recent challenges remain a work in progress. With billions in oil revenue at stake, EG resorts to peculiar tactics to manage its assets. The president proudly notes he is the paymaster general for even routine expenditures (Ref A). This mechanism probably helps constrain corruption, but it also creates suspicion and an obvious bottleneck. Nonetheless, a review of almost any state structure -- from the courts system, to the system of accounting and internal controls, to oversight mechanisms, to organization and constitution of the far-too-numerous ministries -- reveals project after project, all at early stages of establishment. Though institutional development is underway and new talent and better-trained staff beginning to surface, the country is still a long way from being prepared to efficiently serve the public interest. 5. (SBU) The Strange Choices Made by Poor People with Money: EG's first 10-year economic development plan, generated in a 1998 conference open to interested national and international groups, has just been completed. The idea was to make good use of EG's then-newly found oil wealth before it ran out. With EG's petroleum reserves growing and its revenue stream more durable than initially expected, the old plan has recently been replaced by a new one, "Horizon 2020," that seeks to deliver "developing country status" for EG by 2020. Upon review, the infrastructure-intense first plan was remarkably well executed. Early indicators for "Horizon 2020" are likewise promising. While the first plan focused on the "hardware" of modern society -- i.e., roads, bridges, public buildings, ports and airports -- the second recognizes the necessity of complementing structures with "software," focusing on the need to build institutional and human capacity to run and maintain the system. In short, the strategy has been to put a poorly-prepared generation to work in low-skilled jobs building the infrastructure while the next MALABO 00000031 002 OF 004 generation prepares to run a modern society. 6. (SBU) Nonetheless, some of the expenditures are peculiar. For example, there seems to be a fixation -- perhaps issuing from a population long in the dark -- for street lights. Tens-of-thousands have been erected in anticipation of an electric grid that is not yet capable of delivering power to light them. Construction of impressive soccer stadiums in the major cities of Malabo and Bata (towns really -- neither exceeds 150,000 inhabitants) raced the building of the two model schools that lie in direct line of sight. In Malabo, the stadium came first; in Bata, completion of the school edged out the sports complex. There is also a focus on palaces, representational space to wine-and-dine frequently visiting dignitaries. This phenomenon of "keeping up with the African Joneses" is partially explained by EG's intention to prove itself to once-condescending neighbors, all heading this way in 2011 for the African Union Summit. The 53 delegations of the member states will be housed in a brand new "presidential village" housing complex currently being constructed in once-pristine jungle on the outskirts of Malabo. The stadiums are similarly explained -- EG will co-host the Africa Cup soccer tournament the next year (along with neighboring Gabon). Long looked down upon by its African brothers, EG is preparing to show out. The Potemkin village has purpose -- and will eventually even work. 7. (SBU) Internal Crooks: The headlong pace of development has its problems. Apart from being preyed upon by outsiders, Equatoguineans are experiencing a new phenomenon -- a growing crowd of local predators. In the rush to put oil money back into the ground and develop the country, but without the constraints and controls of functioning institutions, the system clearly leaks. On the downstream end (i.e., acquisitions and construction project implementation) the lack of transparency exacerbates concerns that rules are being broken. Grey areas in the legal environment and a residue of regulatory gates and gatekeepers create ample opportunity for graft and corruption. Add to that an array of international contractors willing to start to work with only the sketchiest of plans and supporting documents, along with a nod from "el Jefe" the paymaster, and the boom economy fairly ripples with rumor of who's at the trough and who's on the take. 8. (SBU) While the general population complains about trends and even bristles as the worst abuses, it remains relatively complacent in light of the stunning advances being made throughout the country. The quality of life for the average citizen in EG has seen a great leap forward in the past decade and, though surpassed by the gains of a greedy few, appears to promise enough to inspire continued patience. Also, as is demonstrated to the delight of the average citizen, heads occasionally roll when the president catches (or perhaps finds reason to catch) someone red-handed. For example, "el Jefe" has just changed a number of Justice system leaders while complaining that not enough is being done to constrain greed and corruption among officials (SEPTEL). 9. (SBU) Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics: Many international agencies and institutions rate EG as among the worst of the worst in terms of almost any indicator selected. Yet, from ground level the story appears much better than reported One problem is noise. The bias against EG is animated by a loud chorus of hostile critics from among the diaspora (many of whom left when things were much worse) and the once-colonial, now-disenfranchised Spanish. A dedicated and vicious segment of the Spanish media now effectively filters out most of the good news about EG, and provides a distorted frame of reference for anyone casually seeking information about the only former-Spanish colonial holding in Africa. Unfortunately, this creates a bias within the NGO community for those organizations that fail to undertake due diligence to confirm claims. The problems of EG, already exaggerated by an active and efficient internal rumor mill, are thus often blown all out of proportion by the country's opponents. The country's own extremely limited information culture is another of its problems. The cultural instinct is to clamp down on news. While the information environment is slowly improving, there are still essentially no reliable statistics upon which to base sophisticated assessments. No one even really knows the actual size of the MALABO 00000031 003 OF 004 country's population. 10. (SBU) Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests things are better than generally believed. Numerous daily flights to and from international destinations, and the continent, are full -- and not cheap. Local representatives of the Coca Cola Company tell us EG has the highest level of consumption of its refreshments in Africa. And this "luxury" competes with an extraordinary local thirst for beer -- little wonder authorities are moving quickly to construct municipal sewer plants. The streets of Malabo and Bata, until recently mostly unpaved and all but devoid of traffic, now suffer daily traffic jambs and gridlock. Today, taxis, charging minimum of the equivalent of one dollar, are ubiquitous -- ten years ago it was necessary to schedule an appointment to use one of the handful that existed. The local fuel supplier (Total) tells us that gasoline and diesel consumption is growing exponentially, forcing his company to repeatedly invest in new tanks and supply facilities -- meanwhile EG's parastatal fuel company (GEPetrol) is gearing up to compete. The ruling elite are clearly not the only ones driving cars or drinking Cokes. Things are clearly looking up, and the idea that over half the population of EG lives on less than a dollar a day is implausible. The obvious advances must be particularly galling for those who left when times were tough, and who now see things roaring ahead. A good rule of thumb? Beware of what you are told about EG -- ground truth is likely to differ. 11. (SBU) Martial Law: Since at least Forsythe's "The Dogs of War," EG has been a favorite takeover target for both outside and inside plotters. Its newfound wealth increased both its target profile and internal concern over such threats. The smoking gun of the 2004 Simon Mann-planned coup attempt stiffened the country's already-intimidating security structures. The February 17 raid (Ref B) more recently increased the ops tempo. President Obiang came to power himself in a coup likely assisted from the outside. He and his team know how it works. Though without official declaration, the country persistently operates under martial law-like conditions. This posture generates human rights concerns as documents are checked, guns are displayed and foreigners get the fish eye. The fact that EG employs poorly-educated, front-line cops and soldiers -- who in many other parts of Africa might be common street thugs (perhaps readily available for a pickup game of coup d'etat) -- contributes to the challenge of professionalization. As a result, the responsible international community remains aloof to EG's security needs. So, despite the reputation for toughness, the fact EG is widely denigrated (if not reviled) seems to attract regular attention of buccaneers and adventurers who seem to think they have cover of international opprobrium. With no security allies and only nascent internal capacities, it is difficult for the country to relax or even improve the very mechanisms that get it into trouble on the human rights front. It's hard to retool when you're in the middle of a fight. This negative feedback loop needs to be broken. 12. (SBU) Politics as Unusual: EG is less a rogue state than it is a rudimentary one. Its institutions, those stem cells of democracy, have been stunted by its short, troubled history. Upon assuming leadership Obiang forcefully consolidated power within his party, the "Partido Democratico de Guinea Ecuatorial" (PDGE). As oil wealth arrived, and the party (cloaked as the government) made good on political promises, began to fulfill development plans and brought progress to much of the country's doorstep. The need to maintain power by force has now largely dissipated -- the PDGE is a formidable, but no longer ruthless, political machine. Between itself and a handful of pet coalition partners, it can now count on overwhelming popular support as far as the eye can see. The remaining opposition is pitiful -- fractured, incompetent and disorganized -- and seems to think it can complain itself into office. Elections here will continue to reflect lopsided results in favor of the ruling party. 13. (SBU) Yet behind the curtain the party fairly seethes with intrigue. There are left-right, North-South, East-West, young-old, ethnic-clan, male-female, and regional splits that are bridged only by an old-fashioned African devotion to the chief, and the self restraint of a recently traumatized MALABO 00000031 004 OF 004 population. Despite his reputation of omnipresence, much goes on under the nose of "el Jefe," and the players energetically vie for influence and position. The art of governance is being practiced. Nevertheless, democracy, as we know it, will only arrive in EG once the patriarch is gone and the party comes apart along its various fault lines. In the meantime, practice at elections, improving processes and maturing institutions will help set the stage for real, public political discourse. The generational shift currently underway is clearly contributing to this positive evolution -- and the system is adjusting. To ensure the right outcome, that system will need time, direction and assistance. President Obiang is both well positioned and intentioned to provide the space, and appears, despite his age, to have the stamina to see it through. For the near term, it will be up to outsiders to span the capacity gaps that might help the country reach any goal of real democracy, governing a free market economy. We are clearly best positioned to provide such help -- should we choose to accept that mission. If we don't, others may take the country in a different direction. 14. (SBU) Conclusion: EG is a country poorly prepared for the future thrust upon it by oil riches. While outsiders can be contracted to take care of some of the nuts and bolts issues of development, when it comes to the arch of governance, money alone is not enough to span the yawning capacity gaps. Though much needs to be done to improve EG society, sometimes the country is simply not ready to undertake the necessary work on its own. In the meantime, Obiang's "benevolent authoritarianism" provides an ample incubator for positive changes to occur, though there is competition for his attention among the international players. In any case, at the moment he is unchallenged by any other political figure. If we want to steer EG toward our own goals, we must gain trust of GREG power players and help them move our way. Having proven fickle in the past, we will need to stay engaged to ensure we keep that trust. We have determined in small scale that engagement works -- primarily via the MPRI security professionalization training project and the USAID-supported Social Development Fund, both of which are turning earth and having positive effects. Our support of EITI is also showing results. The door remains open. We have pending requests for help with reform of justice system, regional security cooperation, development of democracy programs and an upcoming request for assistance with improving public finance. The view from here is that these opportunities should be seized. SMITH |
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