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Cable de EE UU en el que un exministro peruano expresa a la Embajada su preocupación por el avance de Ollanta Humala

Fernando Rospigliosi, extitular de Interior en el Gobierno de Alejandro Toledo, pide apoyo para lanzar una campaña anti Humala en las regiones cocaleras

ID: 46333
Date: 2005-11-29 17:14:00
Origin: 05LIMA5061
Source: Embassy Lima
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno: 05LIMA3267 05LIMA4132 05LIMA4854
Destination: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LIMA 005061

SIPDIS

WHA FOR MONSERRATE, FRIEDMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2020
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PTER, PHUM, ASEC, PE
SUBJECT: FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER ROSPIGLIOSI WORRIED ABOUT
OLLANTA HUMALA

REF: A. LIMA 4854
B. LIMA 4132
C. LIMA 3267

Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies for Reasons 1.4
(d)

1. (C) SUMMARY. Former Interior Minister Fernando
Rospigliosi and ex-Director of National Defense Ruben Vargas,
in an 11/18 lunch with Poloffs, expressed concern over
prospects that ultranationalist Ollanta Humala is
establishing himself as a political force to be reckoned
with. They had few ideas on how to arrest Humala's rise,
suggested that the USG review its options, and proposed that
the Embassy should expand the role of its communications
contractor NEXUM to monitor coverage of Humala and promote
anti-Humala news and commentary in the coca regions. (Note:
Rospigliosi works for the Human Social Capital (CHS)
consultancy, which has been contracted by NAS to provide
communications support in anti-narcotics efforts and
anti-trafficking in persons (TIP) services. Vargas also
works for CHS and is a frequent traveler to the coca regions
and other areas in turmoil). END SUMMARY.

3. (C) According to Rospigliosi and Vargas:

-- The failed New Years' rebellion by Ethnocaceristas in
Andahuaylas, led by Ollanta Humala's brother Antauro, has
helped Ollanta in two ways: the radicals and Ethnocaceristas
who supported the rebellion have lined up behind him, while
Ollanta, by distancing himself from his brother, has been
able to portray himself as the "moderate" of the two Humala
brothers and thus broaden his appeal to less radical
anti-system elements. So long as he doesn't have to define
himself, Ollanta could continue to make progress with both
sectors.

-- Ollanta's political base is in the south and the southern
highlands, in areas like Puno, which have a large population
of isolated and impoverished small farmers.

-- He also enjoys significant support in the southern border
city of Tacna, where Ollanta feeds on anti-Chilean sentiment,
and in the northern jungle department of Loreto, where he
appeals to anti-Ecuadorian feelings.

-- Opinion polling, which has Ollanta running at 11 percent,
may understate his support, since opinion polls are carried
out in urban areas (Ref B).

-- Ollanta will not/not obtain enough votes to win the
presidency, but a sizable congressional slate (10-20
legislators) could ride into office on his coattails, thereby
making him a political force to be reckoned with for the
future.

-- Should Evo Morales win the presidency in Bolivia, it
would have a dangerous "demonstration effect" that would help
Ollanta. Should Morales not win the Bolivian election
outright, but simply came close enough to allege fraud and
then take his campaign to the streets, a successful "street
veto" of Bolivia's electoral results by Morales and his
followers would encourage Ollanta's supporters by showing
them "what is possible."

-- Ollanta's wife, Nadine, exercises considerable influence
over her husband. Rospigliosi got to know her well in 2001,
when Ollanta was seeking amnesty for his rebellion against
former President Alberto Fujimori. Ollanta is "a typical
military man" in his thinking and has little understanding of
political nuances. In contrast, his wife, the product of a
middle class family and a journalism major from the
University of Lima, has a much better sense of how to
communicate with the public.

4. (C) Despite their evident concern over Ollanta Humala,
Rospigliosi and Vargas had few suggestions as to how he could
be contained. One possibility, they asserted, was to try and
divide his following, though they had no strategy for doing
so. They warned against making direct attacks on him,
opining that these would be counterproductive and only make
him stronger. In the end, the former Interior Ministry
officials threw the problem into the USG's lap, suggesting
that the Embassy expand the duties of its coca zone
communications-monitoring contractor, NEXUM, to include news
and commentary on Humala to better track Ollanta's
influence/popularity in these regions, since much of his
support flies under the radar of the major media and
urban-based polling. They also suggested that the Embassy
consider supporting an anti-Humala communications program.
-------
COMMENT
-------

5. (C) We share many of Rospigliosi's concerns regarding
Ollanta Humala's rise in the polls and the possibility that
the latter will establish a strong pro-Evo pro-Chavez
political base following the 2006 elections. That said, we
have no/no intention of involving the Embassy in anti-Humala
information or commentary campaigns: that is a task for the
competing political parties. We agree with Rospigliosi's
suggestion that we expand NEXUM's monitoring functions to
include Humala, given his pro-coca policies and the
likelihood that he will form alliances with cocalero
organizations. END COMMENT.
STRUBLE

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